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I. INTRODUCTION 
When observers examine how any individual court has fared at the 
hands of the U.S. Supreme Court, they usually restrict their attention to 
the cases that the justices have taken directly from that court. Thus we 
hear that, in a recent Supreme Court term, such-and-such a court has 
been reversed or vacated in ten of twelve cases or has been affirmed in 
four of seven cases. Those writing about such statistics often appear to 
forget that the Supreme Court regularly reverses or vacates more 
frequently than it affirms, with a “baseline” reversal rate between sixty 
                                                                                                             
1 The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance derived from communications 
with Arthur Hellman and Gail Cox, and to thank Jason Hoppin for the query that 
prompted the article. 
2 B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D. (Political Science), University of Oregon. 
Professor Emeritus, University at Albany - SUNY; Visiting Scholar, University of 
Massachusetts - Dartmouth. 
120 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:119 
percent and two-thirds.3 Nonetheless, that a court has a high proportion 
of its cases reversed in any term receives particular attention, especially 
when the justices have decided more than a few cases from that court. 
This has focused attention on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, the largest federal appellate court, because of instances in 
which virtually all the cases to which the Supreme Court has granted 
review from that court were reversed. Receiving particular recent 
attention was the 1996 Term, where 27 of 28 Ninth Circuit cases were 
reversed or vacated,4 and the 1983 Term, in which the reversal rate for 
the Ninth Circuit was similar. 
Although the statistics based on cases taken directly from Court X 
are important, taken alone they provide an incomplete picture. That is 
because the Supreme Court also rules on the decisions of that court 
indirectly, that is, in cases taken from other courts. Although the picture 
from the latter rulings might not change the justices’ level of support for 
the decisions of Court X, the Supreme Court may support that court 
more, or less, frequently in indirect rulings than in the rulings in cases 
taken directly from it. Were the proportion of support or disagreement 
quite different from that in the Supreme Court’s direct review of Court 
X’s cases, ignoring this information by relying only on direct 
affirmances and reversals would definitely leave a distorted view. In 
short, adding this dimension provides a more complete, or less 
incomplete, picture of the extent to which the Ninth Circuit is in tune 
with the Supreme Court. One must also consider whether the Supreme 
Court has mentioned the lower court’s opinion and the justices’ tone in 
doing so.5 
In one sense, any decision of the Supreme Court speaks to the 
rulings of Court X even if the latter are nowhere mentioned in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion. If Court X has ruled on a subject and a 
Supreme Court decision on that subject sustains, modifies, undercuts, or 
directly contradicts that ruling, lawyers will be quick to call it to the 
attention of Court X’s judges in the next relevant case. If Court X has 
spoken in a particular way about an issue and the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
3 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 219 (4th ed. 1993). 
4 See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998). 
5 Examination of justices’ remarks, positive or negative, about Ninth Circuit cases in 
all cases the justices reviewed from other circuits, whether or not involving an intercircuit 
conflict, is beyond the scope of this study. For such examination of Supreme Court 
opinions in cases from a federal district court after the Ninth Circuit had reviewed them, 
see Stephen L. Wasby, The District of Oregon in the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 851 (2003). 
2005] NINTH CIRCUIT IN THE SUPREME COURT 121 
overturns another court’s identical statement, the Supreme Court has 
effectively overturned the former court as well as the one from which it 
had taken the case it reviewed; likewise, in upholding the statement of 
another court which is similar to Court X’s ruling, it has effectively 
affirmed Court X’s position. 
Yet there are cases in which the rulings of Court X are explicitly 
before the Supreme Court in cases taken from other courts. This is 
particularly so in the principal category of cases to which the Supreme 
Court grants review, those in which there is an intercircuit conflict on the 
point of law at issue.6  If the justices accept a case from the Third Circuit 
to rule on an issue on which the Ninth Circuit has taken a contrary 
stance, the Supreme Court’s action affirming or reversing the Third 
Circuit directly implicates the Ninth Circuit’s position. In this 
hypothetical, when the Third Circuit’s position is affirmed, the result is a 
de facto reversal of the Ninth Circuit; where the Third Circuit is 
reversed, the outcome is an implicit affirmance of the Ninth Circuit’s 
position. In the 1996 Term, for example, in Boggs v. Boggs, the Supreme 
Court, while overturning a Fifth Circuit ruling denying ERISA 
preemption, noted that a Ninth Circuit ruling was “in substantial 
conflict” with the Fifth Circuit,7 and, in so doing, implicitly upheld the 
Ninth Circuit. 
A. The Present Study 
Does the picture provided by the Supreme Court’s treatment of a 
court’s rulings in cases taken from other courts differ from the picture 
given by the results from decisions taken directly in that court? To 
illustrate how the picture provided by intercircuit conflict cases indeed 
may differ from the usually-presented “raw score,” the justices’ rulings 
on intercircuit conflicts in which cases from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are part of the conflict are examined and 
compared with the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases taken directly 
                                                                                                             
6  The Court’s Rules state an intercircuit conflict as a matter to be considered in 
granting certiorari. See Supreme Court Rule 10, in which “the character of the reasons the 
Court considers” are noted when: “(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a 
decision in conflict with the decision on another United States court of appeals on the 
same important matter[.]” SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (effective May 1, 2003). Among the 
important studies discussing intercircuit conflicts as a basis for the grant of certiorari are 
H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (1991) and DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (1980), as well as the work of Arthur D. Hellman, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Light 
on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 
1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247. 
7 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997). 
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from that court.8 The present study, while focusing on one decade, 
encompasses more than two decades. Receiving detailed examination are 
cases the Supreme Court decided in October Terms (“O.T.”) 1980-1989 
and 1990-1999, the latter receiving greater attention, with a brief 
addendum carrying matters forward through the 2003 Term. 
The article begins with the most recent complete decade of the 
Supreme Court’s terms – O.T. 1990 - 1999. After findings from the 
decade are presented, the types of cases in each of five terms (O.T. 1995-
1999) are discussed. Findings from the previous decade, O.T. 1980 - 
1989, are then provided. In the most recent decade, the Supreme Court 
had almost total control of its docket through its certiorari jurisdiction,9 
which produces almost all the cases entailing intercircuit conflicts. This 
makes the period commencing in the late 1980s the most fertile one for 
exploring the Court’s treatment of intercircuit conflict cases. Virtually all 
of the Court’s remaining appeal jurisdiction—except for voting rights 
cases, particularly on reapportionment—had been removed in the mid-
1980s, and the full effect of the severe reduction in appeal cases had 
taken effect in the Supreme Court by O.T. 1990, although appeal cases 
still showed up as late as O.T. 198910 because the change was applicable 
only to cases filed after passage of the statute. 11 
When appeal cases were a significant portion of the Court’s docket, 
a smaller proportion of the Court’s rulings were in intercircuit conflicts. 
                                                                                                             
8 The latter – cases taken directly from the Ninth Circuit – are not separated into 
those which entail an intercircuit conflict and those which do not; whether the Ninth 
Circuit fares differently in those two categories is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, the rate at which the justices reverse the Ninth Circuit suggests that the court of 
appeals does less well in intercircuit conflict cases taken directly from the Ninth Circuit 
than in the intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits in which a Ninth Circuit 
case is part of the conflict. 
In October Term 1996, for which we do have data, ten of the 28 cases from the 
Ninth Circuit that the Supreme Court decided involved intercircuit conflicts. In two, other 
circuits had also adopted the rejected Ninth Circuit position, which had been the majority 
one, while in five cases, the Ninth Circuit was the lone court in conflict with multiple 
courts which adopted the position the Supreme Court upheld. See Herald, supra note 4, 
and Stephen L. Wasby, The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court: Relations Between 
Higher and Lower Courts (1998) (paper presented at annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association; on file with author). 
9 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). See RICHARD H. FALLON, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 468 (5th ed. 2003) (“In 1988, Congress 
completed the gradual transition from mandatory to discretionary review of state court 
decisions by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to eliminate appeals as of right and to make all 
state court judgments reviewable only by writ of certiorari.”). 
10 See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 41 n.15 
(1989) (Court states that although “in the near future our appellate jurisdiction will 
extend only to rare cases” the Court will “assume that the appeal is proper.”). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1257; see supra note 9. 
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A significant number of cases in the appeal jurisdiction came from the 
state courts, whose rulings might conflict with those of other state courts 
but not with rulings of the federal courts of appeals.12 Moreover, rather 
than waiting for an intercircuit conflict to develop, as it could do with 
cases in its certiorari jurisdiction, the Court had to take appeal cases, and 
in those cases, the justices did not indicate disagreement among the 
lower courts in interpretation of the issue before them.13  Although there 
may have been a smaller proportion of Supreme Court cases involving 
intercircuit conflicts in the 1980s than in the 1990s, the number of such 
cases was large because the Court accepted and decided so many more 
cases than in the 1990s, when its plenary decision output was less than 
ninety cases per term.14 
One other aspect of intercircuit conflict cases requires comment. In 
any particular term, Supreme Court cases taken directly from any court 
of appeals were decided in that court within a relatively short period of 
time, approximately a year.15 That may also be true for some of the other 
lower court rulings involved in the conflicts, in which petitions for 
certiorari may have been filed. Thus, two of the four cases the justices 
mentioned in Martin v. Hadix as representing the position opposite to 
that of the case under review were noted as “cert. pending”16 and all the 
cases cited were very recent or only one and two years old, perhaps a 
result of the newness of the statute at issue. Often, however, when an 
intercircuit conflict prompts the justices to review a case, some of the 
cases constituting the conflict may have been decided some time earlier –
indeed, several years before– because a conflict does not necessarily 
develop instantly or within a few months but may have been long in the 
                                                                                                             
12 While federal court-state court conflicts are among the factors the justices 
consider in deciding whether or not to grant review, such conflicts are not included in the 
data for this study. 
13 In those appeals cases disposed of by summary affirmances, there could be no 
notation of inter-court conflict as there was no opinion. 
14 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 403, 406; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist 
Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 578 (2003) (“During all the 
years of the Burger Court and up through the first year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court 
decided about 150 cases per year. During the years of the second Rehnquist Court, the 
Court has decided only about half that many cases.”) 
15 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (the Court decided a circuit split 
within one year after the Fourth Circuit ruled that qualified immunity was proper because 
the right allegedly violated was not “clearly established”). 
16 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999). Generally the justices hold “cert. pending” cases until 
they decide the case they did agree to review, and they then either deny review or grant, 
vacate, and remand (GVR) in light of the newly decided case. 
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making.17 Either the conflict may have existed for some time before the 
justices concluded that a recent case adding to one side of the conflict 
warranted a grant of certiorari, or all the circuits which had decided the 
issue over several years had agreed, with another circuit having created 
the conflict only recently,18 thus prompting the justices’ decision to deal 
with it. 
B. A Note on Data 
The data utilized in this somewhat rudimentary study are in certain 
ways rough and approximate. However, without being able to say a 
priori that the Ninth Circuit’s record would look better or worse after 
adding these cases to those the justices took directly from that court, if 
the new data reveal a distinct difference from the picture shown by the 
regularly-used “raw score” count, we should be put on notice that by 
continuing to rely solely on that measure, we are providing far from a 
complete or accurate picture. In this article, the cases cited by the 
Supreme Court as being in conflict are used to see whether the position 
taken in the Ninth Circuit case cited conforms to what the Supreme Court 
then decides or is contrary to the position the justices adopt. The cases 
used in this study are those which the Court cites as creating or being 
part of an intercircuit conflict, either in the text when it gives such a 
conflict as the reason for granting certiorari, in the footnote attached to 
that text, or at some later point in the opinion.19 Cases not directly cited 
but otherwise clearly identifiable, as when they are referred to as 
collected in a cited lower court ruling, are also used, although it requires 
going beyond the Supreme Court opinion for data. 
Because the Supreme Court at times only cites examples of cases 
on either side of the conflict without appearing to provide a complete 
listing of all circuits that have taken positions on the issue (“E.g., Jones 
                                                                                                             
17 See, for example, Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000), in which the Supreme 
Court resolved a conflict that included a 1990 Ninth Circuit ruling, Reddy v. Litton 
Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), to which the justices had denied certiorari in 1991. 
18 See, for example, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 
U.S. 238, 244 (2000), in which the Court stated that in 1999, the Seventh Circuit had 
“departed from the uniform position of the Courts of Appeals.”  The Ninth Circuit case 
was Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1995). 
19 In addition to noting intercircuit conflicts that lead the justices to grant review, the 
Supreme Court at times has also noted intracircuit conflict. See, for example, United 
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 830 n.1 (1987), there, in a footnote to an 
immigration case from the Eighth Circuit, Justice Marshall stated, “Respondents have at 
no point raised, and we do not express any opinion regarding, the propriety of the group 
deportation procedure used in this case. Compare United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 
F.2d 219, 219-220 (9th Cir. 1978), with United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F.2d 976, 
977 (9th Cir. 1980).” 
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v. Smith, holding X, and Green v. Hill, holding Y.”), this method will 
result in an undercount of cases from any particular court. When the 
Supreme Court refers to “many other lower courts,” without providing a 
citation,20 that the present method provides an undercount is clear.21 In 
this initial exploration, we limit ourselves to cases explicitly cited, on the 
theory that those generally are the ones the Supreme Court considered 
sufficiently significant to mention.  
Also noted but not receiving extended treatment here are instances 
in these intercircuit conflict cases when the Supreme Court has referred, 
either positively or negatively, to Ninth Circuit law not involved in an 
intercircuit conflict. For example, in a 1997 case from the Eighth Circuit, 
the justices, noting that “the Courts of Appeals have adopted different 
standards . . . for deciding whether a federal instrumentality may sue in 
federal court to enjoin state taxation where the United States is not a co-
plaintiff,” upheld the Ninth Circuit’s position, based on an earlier First 
Circuit case, as well as the First Circuit’s later, modified position.22 On 
the other side, in ruling on a Seventh Circuit case on standing, when 
Justice Scalia criticized several courts of appeals for their practice of 
proceeding by assuming jurisdiction to decide the merits (the “doctrine 
of hypothetical jurisdiction”), three of seven cases he cited were from the 
Ninth Circuit.23 While dissenting Justice Stevens called this part of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion “pure dictum” and as “com[ing] to the same 
thing as an advisory opinion,” 24 there is no question that the Court had 
disapproved of the Ninth Circuit practice. 
In recording data, a “plus” sign is given to lower court rulings in 
which the lower court’s position and the Supreme Court’s holding are in 
agreement, and a “minus” sign to those in which the courts have taken 
contrary stances. When in a single case, the justices decide more than 
one issue implicating an intercircuit conflict, and the Court supports a 
                                                                                                             
20 See, for example, Coil Indus. Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan, 489 U.S. 
561, 568 (1989), where the Court observed, “We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
in the lower courts over” the issue. See also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 363 (2000); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983). 
21 For present purposes, the same is true when the sources cited are difficult to 
access, as in a reference to cases cited in an addendum to a brief. 
22 Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 830 (1997). A further 
example is Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), in which the Supreme Court took the 
same position on a particular issue as had all courts of appeals, including the Ninth 
Circuit. As Justice Kennedy put it, “[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals and with all 
other courts of appeals which have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Baja v. Ducharme, 187 
F.3d 1075, 1078-1079 (9th Cir 1999)” and then citing cases from five other circuits. Id. at 
432. 
23 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (citing cases). 
24 Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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lower court on one issue while disagreeing with it on the other, the case 
is scored as mixed (+/-) or a “split” result, counted as .5 support rather 
than 1.0 support. Each case is given the same weight, although some may 
object that “landmark” cases, or what are taken to be such cases, such as 
the “assisted suicide” case25 or the “spotted owl” environmental case,26 
are more important than those on “small” points of civil procedure. In 
short, some may wish to argue that some cases are more equal than 
others, but for present purposes each case counts the same as each other 
case. 
There are instances when the division between or among circuits on 
a legal question is fairly straightforward, with circuits lining up cleanly 
on either side, and with lower courts’ positions at direct odds with that 
the Supreme Court adopts. However, scoring the lower court’s ruling in 
relation to the Supreme Court’s resolution is not always easy. This is true 
when the courts of appeals have adopted a range of positions27 and the 
justices’ holding is at a point on the continuum quite near, but not exactly 
identical to, that of the lower court on which the observer is focusing. In 
this study, the basic rule is that if the Supreme Court does not adopt the 
Ninth Circuit’s position, the case is scored “minus” even if the lower 
court’s position is midway between the adopted and rejected positions. 
That is, “not Supreme Court” is “no.” This is so because of two reasons: 
one is that because the Supreme Court’s position is the rule the lower 
courts must now apply, regardless of how “close” their previous position 
was to the one the justices adopted. The other is that it is difficult to 
construct an appropriate metric for determining how near or close the 
lower court position was to the Supreme Court’s holding. However, in 
some instances a “(+)” or “(-)” has been assigned when the Supreme 
Court neither directly supports nor opposes the lower court position but 
takes a position quite close to the latter’s view. Thus, a “(+)” would be 
assigned if the justices reach the same basic result as the lower court but 
adopt somewhat different reasoning in doing so.28 From the perspective 
of the lower court, this scoring system is conservative because it makes it 
                                                                                                             
25 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), rev’g Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). 
26 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
27 See, for example, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 
56 (1987), where the Court referred to the “three-way conflict in the Circuits” in a case 
not involving the Ninth Circuit. 
28 See, for example, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 185-186 (1977), 
where the Court indicated three positions. While the justices explicitly rejected the Third 
Circuit’s position, they did not rule on whether the Eighth Circuit’s or Ninth Circuit’s 
position was correct. 
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less likely that the court of appeals will receive credit for having adopted 
a position the Supreme Court approves. 
Reliance is placed on what the Supreme Court says about lower 
court cases, that is, its characterization of those rulings –usually the 
statement of the holding that appears in parentheses following the case 
citation– if that allows a clear inference as to the side of a conflict on 
which a lower court ruling falls. At times, while not engaging in 
extensive discussion, the Court reports the lower court rulings in a 
sentence or more, but most often only citations are provided and little 
more is said. When the Supreme Court opinion indicates only that cases 
are on opposite sides of an issue but does not indicate their holdings (e.g, 
“Compare Jones v. Smith with Green v. Hill.”), the court of appeals’ 
opinions have been examined to make a determination; this is also 
necessary when the direction of the Supreme Court’s citation is unclear.29 
This method is certainly not as precise as would be the case if one 
engaged in the far more labor-intensive task of comparing every 
Supreme Court ruling on an intercircuit conflict with the text of cited 
lower court rulings or, even more onerous, the corpus of a lower court’s 
doctrine. Yet it should provide a basic picture that may prompt other 
observers of the relation between the Supreme Court and lower courts to 
look further. That should certainly be the case if there is divergence 
between how a court fares in intercircuit conflict cases from other 
circuits and how it fares when the justices directly review its cases. On 
the other hand, if the two sets of data converge, then the “raw score” data 
for cases taken directly from a court might continue to be seen as broadly 
indicative of how the court was treated by its judicial superiors. 
II. FINDINGS: 1990 - 1999 TERMS 
We now turn to examine the Ninth Circuit’s record in the Supreme 
Court’s 1990-1999 Terms based on the intercircuit conflict cases from 
other circuits in which the Ninth Circuit was part of the conflict. The 
principal finding is that in all ten terms, the Ninth Circuit fared better in 
the Supreme Court’s rulings on intercircuit conflicts in cases taken from 
other courts of appeals than in Ninth Circuit cases reviewed directly.30 In 
all ten terms, the Supreme Court had reversed or vacated well more half 
the latter, whereas in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits, 
                                                                                                             
29 See, e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 n.1 (1982). 
There, after the listing of courts whose decisions conflicted with the Third Circuit (from 
which the case came), there is a “Cf.” cite with several cases listed. The meaning of 
“Cf.”citation to a Ninth Circuit case is not clear. 
30 Not included are cases in which certiorari is granted and the case is vacated and 
remanded (GVR), usually for consideration in light of an earlier Supreme Court ruling. 
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the justices supported the Ninth Circuit position in at least half such 
cases in four terms and, even when ruling against the Ninth Circuit in 
less than fifty percent of a term’s cases, upheld the lower court’s position 
at a higher rate than in the Ninth Circuit’s cases that were directly 
reviewed, and often by substantial percentage differences. Over the ten-
year period, in these cases Ninth Circuit law was sustained at a 49 
percent rate, as compared to roughly 20 percent in cases taken directly 
from the Ninth Circuit, a difference of 29 percent. Adding the 
“intercircuit conflict” and “direct” cases, the Ninth Circuit position was 
sustained just under one-third of the time (31.9%), not a shabby showing 
considering that the Supreme Court takes cases primarily to reverse 
them.  
How the Ninth Circuit fared in the cases the Supreme Court took 
directly from it provides a baseline. The rate at which the justices 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit in cases reviewed directly from that court, 
although averaging roughly twenty percent, ranged from a low of 3.6 
percent in the infamous 1996 Term and a 10 percent affirmance rate in 
O.T. 1999, to a high of just under one-third – 31.3% and 32.6% in O.T. 
1991 and O.T. 1992, respectively; no particular trend was evident over 
the decade. For the remainder of the terms, the affirmance rate stood at 
about 20 percent – slightly over in O.T. 1993 (21.4%) and 1998 (23.7%), 
right at that proportion (20.6%) in O.T. 1997, and below in O.T. 1990 
(15.4%) and 1995 (17.9%). 
Likewise, the justices’ support of the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit 
conflict cases taken from other circuits had a considerable range – 61.9 
percentage points – from a low of 23.1 percent (O.T. 1995) to a high of 
85 percent (O.T. 1996). Again, no particular trend is evident as the 
proportion of support varies over time while averaging almost one-half 
(48.8%). Of particular note, in addition to O.T. 1996, is O.T. 1999, when 
the Ninth Circuit position was supported in two-thirds of the intercircuit 
conflict cases in which its rulings were involved, and the two terms in 
which the Ninth Circuit position was supported in half the cases – O.T. 
1990 (53.8%) and O.T. 1998 (50%). In five other terms, support for the 
Ninth Circuit was from one-third (O.T. 1994) to somewhat less than half 
(45.8%, O.T. 1991), so that it fell below one-third in only one term, O.T. 
1995 (23.1%). 
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How much better did the Ninth Circuit do in intercircuit conflict 
cases from other circuits than in cases the justices took directly from that 
court? If the proportion of affirmance in Ninth Circuit “direct review” 
cases is subtracted from the proportion of support for the Ninth Circuit 
position in intercircuit conflict cases from other circuits, the difference 
averaged almost 30 percent (29.2%) but with a very wide range – a full 
76.2 percentage points. The difference was less than 10 percent in only 
one term, O.T. 1995, the term in which the justices’ support for the Ninth 
Circuit in intercircuit conflict cases was lowest. However, even then it 
remained higher than its support for that court in direct review cases, 
shrinking the margin to 5.2 percent so that, while the two separate 
measures of support come close to converging in that term, they do not 
do so. Thus, at least in the 1990’s, support for the Ninth Circuit is never 
greater in cases taken directly from that court. 
Put differently, support for the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit conflict 
cases from other courts was greater than support for the Ninth Circuit in 
cases directly from that court by more than 10 percent in all but one term 
during the decade. In two terms, the difference was from 10 to 15 percent 
(O.T. 1992: 10.7%; O.T. 1991: 14.4%); it was in the 20 percent range in 
three other terms (O.T. 1993: 22.l%; O.T. 1997: 22.3%; O.T. 1998: 
26.3%); and in one other, it exceeded one-third (O.T. 1990: 38.4%). The 
difference actually exceeded 50 percent in two relatively recent terms – 
O.T. 1999, when it was 56.7%, and O.T. 1996, when it was a 
monumental 81.4%. That last figure may seem astounding, but it results 
from a juxtaposition of the Court’s lowest recent one-term support for 
the Ninth Circuit in cases directly reviewed with its highest support for 
the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other courts of 
appeals. 
The figures for O.T. 1996 and O.T. 1999 are particularly important, 
because these are the two terms during the 1990s in which the Supreme 
Court most frequently reversed the Ninth Circuit in cases taken directly 
from that circuit. Yet in intercircuit conflict cases drawn from other 
circuits, these are the two terms in which the Ninth Circuit not only did 
better than it had done in “direct” cases but in fact did exceptionally well, 
as its position was validated upwards of two-thirds of the time. The 
juxtaposition of the high approval rate for Ninth Circuit rulings in 
intercircuit cases from other circuits with high reversal of rulings in cases 
taken directly from the Ninth Circuit could not be more stark. 
This is not to suggest that there is a correlation, much less a causal 
relationship, between the two phenomena. However, that approval rates 
in intercircuit conflict cases and reversal rates in direct cases do not 
move in parallel reinforces the need to examine both figures for any 
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given Supreme Court term in order to get a more extensive, and thus 
more accurate, picture of how a court of appeals fares at the Supreme 
Court’s hands. That juxtaposition severely underscores that the picture 
one obtains by restricting oneself to direct review cases provides an 
incomplete, nay, a distorted view. Where observers talked about the 
beating the Ninth Circuit received in O.T. 1996, they should have been 
talking as well about the high rate of support Ninth Circuit positions 
received in cases implicating intercircuit conflicts. 
That finding leads to an examination of the picture that would be 
obtained by combining the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases the 
justices took directly from the Ninth Circuit and cases in which the Court 
took a stance on Ninth Circuit rulings when it decided intercircuit 
conflict cases from other courts of appeals. This combination shows that 
the Ninth Circuit’s position is upheld slightly under one-third of the time 
(31.9%). However, a particularly noticeable effect is that the range of 
support becomes compressed – to only 26 percentage points – as the 
already-noted high and low percentages are cancelled out. The lowest 
Supreme Court support for Ninth Circuit positions is now one-fifth 
(20.4%) in the 1995 Term, a result of the combination of the lowest level 
of support in intercircuit cases and a relatively high reversal rate in cases 
taken directly from the Ninth Circuit, while the highest combined 
support is less than one-half – 46.4 percent in the 1999 Term, where the 
two-thirds support in intercircuit conflict cases overcomes a very low 
affirmance rate (10 percent) in direct cases because the number of the 
latter is small (only 10 percent). Overall, the combined level of support is 
between 20 and 30 percent in four (consecutive) terms (O.T. 1993 - 
1996), around the mid-30s in the three prior consecutive terms (O.T. 
1990 - 1992) and O.T. 1997, and two-fifths or more in the decade’s last 
two terms (40 percent in O.T. 1998, in addition to the already-noted 46.4 
percent in O.T. 1999). 
III. A LOOK AT SOME INDIVIDUAL TERMS 
With the levels of support the Supreme Court has given the Ninth 
Circuit in the two types of cases and the resulting differences in support 
levels between the two types of cases now having been have been 
presented, a closer examination of the individual terms is in order. For 
these purposes, five terms – O.T. 1995-1999 – are discussed, with the 
most recent of those five terms presented first. 
A. O.T. 1999 
In its 1999 Term, while the Supreme Court affirmed only one of ten 
Ninth Circuit cases it took directly from that court, it supported the Ninth 
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Circuit’s position in two-thirds of the intercircuit conflict cases taken 
from other circuits in which a Ninth Circuit case was part of the conflict. 
Most of the rulings were on matters of federal law and came in what 
were not landmark decisions. 
Among the issues in which the Ninth Circuit’s position was 
supported were when tax remittances were “paid”;31 who was authorized 
to sue under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”);32 whether the Fair Labor Standards Act permitted an 
employer to force use of compensatory time;33 what evidence is 
necessary to support a verdict under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”);34 and two civil Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) matters—a statute of limitations 
issue and the necessary content of a conspiracy claim.35 In addition, in a 
case concerning preemption under the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had 
ruled in favor of preemption, but the Supreme Court’s basis for that 
preemption differed from the lower court’s.36  
Several questions related to federal criminal statutes: whether arson 
of a private residence not used for commercial purposes fell within the 
federal arson statute, implicating the scope of the Commerce Clause;37 
whether penalizing use of a “machinegun” was a separate offense or a 
sentencing factor;38 and what elements of an offense were necessary to 
obtain a lesser included offense jury instruction.39 There were also 
rulings on two issues of constitutional importance: the propriety and 
necessary elements of a public university activity fee for extracurricular 
student speech,40 and whether state and local educational agencies were 
permitted to loan educational materials and equipment to private 
schools,41 in which two early important church-state rulings42 were 
overruled. 
The smaller number of decisions in which the justices adopted the 
views of circuits whose positions were contrary to that of the Ninth 
Circuit included the issues of whether an heir’s interest in an estate was 
                                                                                                             
31 Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431 (2000). 
32 Harris Trust & Savs. v. Solomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238 (2000) 
33 Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) 
34 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Co., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
35 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000). 
36 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
37 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
38 Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000). 
39 Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000). 
40 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
41 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
42 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
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“property” under the federal lien statute;43 whether Federal Arbitration 
Act venue provisions were permissive;44 and what was the burden of 
proof for an officer’s liability for a corporation’s failure to pay taxes.45 In 
the criminal sphere, the issues were whether one could represent oneself 
in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction46 and when supervised 
release commenced in relation to date of release from prison.47 The most 
important issue, which was also related to the Court’s growing federal 
jurisprudence, was whether the ADEA abrogated states’ Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.48 
In addition to these rulings in intercircuit conflict matters, the 
Supreme Court also spoke to Ninth Circuit rulings in two other cases 
involving rulings by several courts of appeals. In one, the Ninth Circuit 
was not involved in the intercircuit conflict that led the Supreme Court to 
take the case, but in one part of the opinion, the position of the Ninth 
Circuit and several other courts of appeals on a point relied on by 
petitioner was said to be “of questionable consistency” with the relevant 
Federal Rule.49 In the other case, there was no intercircuit conflict: all the 
courts of appeals were on the same side of an issue, and the Supreme 
Court approved their position.50 
B. O.T. 1998 
In the eleven intercircuit conflict cases in which a Ninth Circuit 
case was part of the conflict in O.T. 1998, the Ninth Circuit’s position 
prevailed in five and was overturned in five. The remaining case, which 
involved application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 
attorneys’ fee provisions to cases pending when the statute became 
effective, was a “split decision” for the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled 
that the new law capped all fees paid post-statute even for prior work,51 
while the justices upheld such a cap only for post-Act work.52 
The cases in which the Ninth Circuit’s position was upheld 
included the antitrust issue of whether certain group boycotts were per se 
violations;53 the availability of a cause of action under the civil rights 
                                                                                                             
43 Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999). 
44 Cortez Byrd Chips v. Harbert, 529 U.S. 193 (2000). 
45 Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000). 
46 Martinez v. C.A. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
47 United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). 
48 Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
49 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 453 (2000). 
50 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 
51 Madrid v. Gomez, 150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998). 
52 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (2000). 
53 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
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conspiracy statute for conspiracy to terminate an “at-will” employee;54 
and, in criminal procedure, whether a guilty plea or statements at a plea 
colloquy waived the right to silence at sentencing.55 Also on this side of 
the ledger were two cases of somewhat broader significance – one on 
when a school board was liable under Title IX for student-on-student 
sexual harassment56 and the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting case,57 
on the important First Amendment issue of whether a ban on 
broadcasting lottery information could be applied to advertisements of 
legal gambling from stations located where the gambling was legal. 
The other side of the balance sheet included cases on appellate 
procedure, on the appealability of a sanctions order;58 bankruptcy, on the 
rights of pre-bankruptcy stockholders in relation to senior creditors’ 
rights;59 employment law, on the relation between Social Security 
Disability Insurance claims and suits for improper discharge under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act;60 and criminal procedure, on the intent 
required under the federal carjacking statute61 and whether a warrant was 
required to seize a car thought to be forfeitable.62 
C. O.T. 1997 
The 1997 Term was one in which the justices ruled against the 
Ninth Circuit is a majority of both cases taken directly from that court 
and those implicated in their rulings on intercircuit conflicts, although 
the lower court fared slightly better in the latter. The Ninth Circuit’s 
position was upheld in a bankruptcy case on certain pre-bankruptcy 
transfers63 and in cases involving the amount of evidence necessary to 
withstand summary judgment in damages action against government 
official;64 the prerequisites to federal suit over agency shop fees;65 when 
state trial courts must instruct on lesser included offense in capital 
cases;66 whether, in a suit to challenge parole revocation procedures, 
collateral consequences of a probation revocation would be presumed or 
                                                                                                             
54 Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998). 
55 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
56 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
57 Greater New Orleans Broad. Co. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
58 Cunningham v. Hamilton Co., 527 U.S. 198 (1999). 
59 Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
60 Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
61 Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999). 
62 Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999). 
63 Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998). 
64 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
65 Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998). 
66 Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998). 
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had to be shown;67 and the effect on removal to federal court of the 
presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment.68 
The slightly more numerous cases in which the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of those courts of appeals holding a position counter to that 
of the Ninth Circuit were the amounts obtained through “actual fraud” 
not subject to discharge in bankruptcy;69 the federal government’s 
priority to be paid from an estate;70 the NLRB’s standard concerning 
employer doubts about union majority support;71 and the basis for 
removal of state law claims to federal court under federal question 
jurisdiction.72 
Substantially represented among these cases were questions of 
criminal law and procedure. These were: the availability of an 
“exculpatory no” (mere denial of wrongdoing) in false statements to 
federal investigators;73 whether a sentence for an alien returning to the 
U.S. after deportation on conviction of aggravated felony was a penalty 
provision or a separate offense;74 the meaning of “carries a firearm” 
during a crime,75 a case in which the Court also spoke approvingly of a 
related position taken by the Ninth Circuit and all other courts of appeals, 
which was thus not a matter of intercircuit conflict; and the effect of state 
restoration of civil rights on an enhanced sentence for a felon carrying a 
firearm,76 in which the Ninth Circuit’s position, which Justice Kennedy 
categorized as an “intermediate” reading of the statute, had been reached 
in an en banc ruling. 
D. O.T. 1996 
The 1996 Term is the one that people call to mind when they think 
of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Ninth Circuit. Of the twenty-
eight cases the Supreme Court agreed to review from the Ninth Circuit – 
a number representing a disproportionate amount of the Supreme Court’s 
caseload – only one was affirmed. Yet far less visible was the fact that, in 
another ten cases in which the justices spoke of Ninth Circuit rulings that 
were part of the intercircuit conflict before the Supreme Court, the Court 
upheld the Ninth Circuit’s position in eight cases, held against the Ninth 
                                                                                                             
67 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). 
68 Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998). 
69 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). 
70 United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998). 
71 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
72 Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998). 
73 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998). 
74 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
75 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
76 Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998). 
136 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:119 
Circuit position in only one – on the effect of a judge’s error in not 
submitting the materiality of a false statement to the jury.77 
In the remaining case, an appeal from a Benefits Review Board 
award which required treatment of two issues of statutory interpretation 
under the Longshoremans and Harbor Workers Compensation Act 
(“LHWCA”), the justices ruled against the Ninth Circuit position on one 
point, holding that, before a worker’s death, the worker’s spouse was not 
a “person entitled to compensation” for death benefits and thus did not 
forfeit the right to collect such benefits when she did not obtain the 
employer’s approval of settlements with third parties before her spouse’s 
death. However, they ruled for the Ninth Circuit view on the other issue, 
holding that because the Department of Labor is an “agency” to be 
named as respondent on review of a Benefits Review Board’s decision in 
a LHWCA case, the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs could be named as respondent in the court of appeals.78 
Intercircuit conflicts on both points had given rise to the grant of 
certiorari. On the latter issue, the position of the Fourth Circuit, where 
the case originated, had conflicted with views of the D.C. and Ninth 
Circuit, which the Supreme Court adopted, but on the former issue, 
where the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were “in disagreement,” the justices 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s position.79 
The range of topics in the cases in which the Ninth Circuit’s 
position was upheld was quite broad. Included were ERISA preemption 
of state community property laws;80 whether punitive damages in a 
personal injury tort suit were taxable gross income;81 in bankruptcy law, 
the value of collateral retained for use in business;82 securities law; in 
employment discrimination, whether former employees were 
“employees” for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision;83 and 
two criminal matters – criminal liability for insider trading84 and whether 
                                                                                                             
77 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997). 
78 Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 
248 (1997). There were two other cases, neither involving a conflict, in which the Court 
supported the Ninth Circuit in one and ruled against its position in the other. United 
States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997). 
79 Petitioner Ingalls Shipbuilding had drawn on the Ninth Circuit position. In dealing 
with Ingalls’ claim, Justice O’Connor made additional comments about Ninth Circuit 
law, as she quoted from an earlier Ninth Circuit case and cited another in talking about an 
issue the Court did not reach in this case. 
80 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). 
81 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
82 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). 
83 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
84 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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certain sentences could be concurrent.85 Also included was one of the 
first cases interpreting the habeas corpus provisions of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), dealing with that law’s 
application to pending cases.86 
The last case, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp.,87 concerned civil RICO 
statute-of-limitations rules, and it can be said to be only a temporary 
upholding of the court of appeals’ position. On the major aspect of the 
case, while explicitly rejecting the interpretation of one court of appeals, 
the justices, “recogniz[ing] that our holding . . . does not resolve other 
conflicts among the Circuits” which they felt the case’s facts did not 
require them to resolve, reserved judgment on the choice between the 
conflicting rules other circuits had adopted, in effect leaving all 
temporarily in place.88 In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia complained 
that the majority had not reached the question presented and observed 
that the Court had granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit case that was 
part of the conflict and had given it plenary treatment but had then 
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.89 
E. O.T. 1995 
Interestingly, the previous term presented quite a different picture. 
The Ninth Circuit did far less well in October Term 1995 cases from 
other circuits taken to resolve intercircuit conflict cases implicating its 
decisions. Indeed, in this regard, it did least well of the ten years in the 
decade under examination. The Ninth Circuit’s position was sustained 
only with respect to two criminal procedure issues – cumulative 
punishment for a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) conviction90 and 
the standard of review concerning the basis for searches91 – and 
preemption of state claims under the Medical Device Amendments.92 In 
addition, the justices upheld a Tax Court ruling involved in a Ninth 
Circuit case, but the latter court had decided the case on other grounds.93   
                                                                                                             
85 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997). 
86 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 
87 521 U.S. 179 (1997). 
88 Id. at 191. On other elements in the case, not entailing an intercircuit conflict, the 
justices cited the Ninth Circuit’s caselaw approvingly. 
89 See Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1003 
(1996), cert. dismissed, 519 U.S. 233 (1997). 
90 Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996). 
91 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). 
92 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
93 C.I.R. v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996). In another case, the Ninth Circuit was 
among the six courts of appeals on the side to which the government switched its 
position, leading the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand (GVR) the 
decision before it. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996). 
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The range of cases in which the justices undermined the Ninth 
Circuit’s position was considerable, extending from jurisdiction and civil 
procedure through economic regulation, including labor relations, to 
criminal law issues. The economic regulation issues included an 
employer’s ERISA fiduciary duties94 and the labor relations questions of 
treatment of “deadhead” transportation time under the Hours of Service 
Act95 and National Labor Relations Act coverage of live-haul workers;96 
there was also a question of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity from damage suits under the Rehabilitation Act.97 The criminal 
law issues both involved sentencing – a departure from the Guidelines in 
relation to a statutory minimum98 and the effect of aggregated sentences 
on a defendant’s jury trial rights.99 There were two questions in the latter 
case, but having decided that there was no jury trial right where 
aggregated sentences exceeded six months, the justices said they did not 
need to reach the question of whether such right was eliminated by a 
judge’s pretrial ruling that the aggregate sentence would not exceed six 
months.100 
IV. THE DECADE OF THE 1980S 
We have presented findings for the 1990s along with a closer look 
at half the terms from that period. What can by learned by looking at the 
prior decade? The period from O.T. 1980 through O.T. 1989 covers the 
time when the Court’s appeal jurisdiction was severely curtailed such 
that it all but ended. It was also a period of substantially greater output 
on the merits per term, so that the number of intercircuit conflict cases 
therefore remained high despite the jurisdictional alteration. 
The picture from the decade of the 1980s is different from that of 
the 1990s in a number of respects. The Ninth Circuit fared better in the 
Supreme Court both in cases taken directly from the court of appeals and 
in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits, leading to the 
greatest difference from the later decade—in the overall rate at which the 
court’s position was upheld. As in the 1990s, overall the Ninth Circuit 
did better in the intercircuit conflict cases than in the cases directly 
reviewed, except for two terms in which the figures reverse—that is, the 
                                                                                                             
94 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
95 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 516 
U.S. 152 (1996). 
96 Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996). 
97 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). 
98 Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996). 
99 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996). 
100 The Ninth Circuit had found a jury right but that the judge’s limiting the sentence 
cured any error. Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).         
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rate in directly reviewed cases is better than that for intercircuit conflict 
cases—and another term in which there was no difference, that is, the 
same proportion of cases was upheld in each category. However, the 
difference between the two figures for the decade as a whole is roughly 
the same as that for the 1990s although slightly lower. Considerable 
differences from year to year remain, but the range in intercircuit conflict 
cases is more compressed while there is a greater range in the rate at 
which directly reviewed cases were affirmed and in the “difference” 
scores; the range for the combined (intercircuit and directly reviewed) 
cases is roughly the same as it was to be in the 1990s. 
As with our examination of the 1990s, we first look at the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the Ninth Circuit in cases taken directly from that 
court. The justices upheld the Ninth Circuit in somewhat over one-third 
(35.2%) of these cases throughout the decade, but the rate of affirmance 
ranged from a low of 7.1 percent in the 1983 Term – the decade’s 
equivalent of, and precursor to, the renowned 1996 Term – to a high of 
57.1 percent. Indeed, in the last three terms of the decade, the Ninth 
Circuit was affirmed at least half the time (55.8%, 57.1% and 50%), and 
in two others (1981, 1986), the affirmance rate was over two-fifths – at 
the mid-40-percent level. In only one term other than O.T. 1996 was the 
affirmance rate as low as 25 percent. 
In intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits, when a Ninth 
Circuit case was part of the conflict, in only two of the ten terms was the 
Ninth Circuit’s position upheld less than half the time; the figure fell 
only to 44.4 percent in O.T. 1986 and 40.9 percent in the 1989 Term. In 
four terms, the Ninth Circuit’s position was sustained in over 70 percent 
of the relevant cases, and in two of those terms (1980 and 1984), the rate 
was 75 percent. In O.T. 1983, like O.T. 1996 because of the very high 
reversal rate for directly reviewed Ninth Circuit cases, the Ninth 
Circuit’s position was sustained in three-fifths of the intercircuit conflict 
cases in which its rulings were involved, a rate close to the decade-long 
average of 60.1 percent. 
Given that the rates at which the Ninth Circuit is upheld in the two 
categories of cases do not move in parallel, what are the differences in 
the rates? For the ten years, the difference averages to roughly twenty-
five percentage points, somewhat less than for the 1990s, and the range is 
62 percentage points, also a few points less than in the 1990s. The 
“width” of the range in the 1980s is accounted for by the fact that it 
extends from the 1983 Term, when the difference was over 50 
percentage points (52.9%) because the 60 percent rate at which the Ninth 
Circuit position prevailed in intercircuit conflict cases accompanied the 
sharply lowest affirmance rate in directly reviewed cases, to -9.1 percent 
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in the 1989 Term, when the Ninth Circuit was upheld more in directly 
reviewed than in intercircuit conflict cases. As earlier noted, there was 
another term (1988) in which the difference was negative, that is, when 
directly reviewed cases were affirmed at higher rate than were cases in 
intercircuit conflicts, and one term (1986) in which there was no 
difference, as the justices upheld the Ninth Circuit an identical rate 
(44.4%) in both categories of cases. 
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Combining intercircuit conflict cases with directly reviewed ones 
reveals that, as with the 1990s decade, the range of outcomes (the rate at 
which the Ninth Circuit’s position is upheld) is compressed relative to 
the ranges for either type of case separately. The smallest rate at which 
the Ninth Circuit was upheld with the cases combined is 25.6 percent in 
the 1983 Term. This was the year of the “spike” in reversals, which 
served to offset the relatively high rate at which the court of appeals’ 
position was upheld in intercircuit conflict cases. At the other end of the 
spectrum was the 1987 Term, when the Ninth Circuit’s position was 
sustained over three-fifths of the time (62.9%); the rate dropped 
somewhat but remained above half (55.0%) in the following term. There 
are five terms in which the Ninth Circuit’s views were sustained half the 
time or slightly below that (in the high 40’s). We find only one term in 
addition to O.T. 1983 in which the combined rate is below 40 percent – 
the 1984 Term, following the “year of the spike,” when the rate was 35 
percent. 
V. AND BRIEFLY FORWARD: INTO THE NEW CENTURY 
To bring the picture from the twentieth century’s last two decades 
up to date, a brief look at the first terms of the new century are in order, 
to provide some assurance that the patterns already identified did not 
change significantly. What, then, happened in the Supreme Court’s 2000 
- 2003 Terms? In the 2000 Term, the number of intercircuit conflict 
cases taken from other circuits but in which a Ninth Circuit case was part 
of the conflict remained relatively high –between ten and twenty, as in 
the previous two decades– but it is noteworthy that for the next three 
terms (O.T. 2001-2003), the number of such cases was only four or five 
per term.101 
For all four terms, the Ninth Circuit fared quite well when the 
Supreme Court used cases from other circuits to state the law in 
intercircuit conflict situations in which a Ninth Circuit case was part of 
the conflict. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit did exceedingly well, never having 
its position upheld in less than fifty percent of such situations and being 
upheld in all such cases in the 2002 Term.102 As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit clearly did far better in such situations than in the cases taken 
directly from it, for which the reversal rate remained very close to 75 
                                                                                                             
101 In O.T. 2000, one of the intercircuit conflicts came in a case which the Supreme 
Court took from a state court. C & L Enters. v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 
(2001). The same was true in O.T. 2003, when the Court decided Missouri v. Seibert, 124 
S.Ct. 2601 (2004), from the Missouri Supreme Court. 
102 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (the University of Michigan 
Law School affirmative action case). 
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percent for each term. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s “advantage” in 
intercircuit conflict cases from other circuits over its situation when its 
decisions were directly reviewed ranged from 26.5 percent (O.T. 2000) 
to two terms in which it stood at just above 33 percent and one term 
(O.T. 2002) in which it was an unusual 76 percent. 
When directly reviewed Ninth Circuit cases are combined with the 
intercircuit conflicts in which the Ninth Circuit was a part, the rate at 
which the Ninth Circuit’s position was overturned, far from being a high 
rate of the sort which has received opprobrium, is rather respectable. 
Indeed, for all four terms, the figure extends from a low of only 32.1 
percent in the most recently fully-completed term (O.T. 2003) to a high 
of 38.6 percent (O.T. 2001), with the other terms right above one-third. 
VI. WHAT MIGHT THIS MEAN? 
Some intercircuit conflict cases do involve one-on-one conflicts, 
with only one circuit on each side of the issue. An example is Boggs v. 
Boggs, which is unusual in that Justice Kennedy not only noted the 
conflict but stressed its importance because of the size of the circuits 
involved.103 However, far from all intercircuit conflict cases involve such 
one-on-one conflicts but instead they usually require the justices to favor 
the position of several courts over one or more other courts. An example, 
also from O.T. 1996, is the Sentencing Guidelines case of United States 
v. LaBonte,104 where, in reversing the First Circuit, the justices ruled 
against the Ninth Circuit position, which had adopted the First Circuit 
view, while five other circuits had ruled in the direction the Supreme 
Court adopted. 
Multiple courts are usually on the side of the conflict the justices 
uphold. Thus, in any single case, several circuits are likely to have “+” 
scores, particularly when the justices have taken a case that creates a 
conflict with several other circuits and, by reversing that ruling, uphold 
all the others. Thus we might well expect that any court of appeals would 
have a better record in intercircuit conflict cases than in cases taken 
directly from that circuit. Yet even if we do expect any court of appeals 
to do better in intercircuit cases than in their “direct” cases, which the 
                                                                                                             
103 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997) (“The division between the Circuits is 
significant, for the Fifth Circuit has jurisdiction over the community property States of 
Louisiana and Texas, while the Ninth Circuit includes the community property States of 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington.”). 
104 520 U.S. 751 (1997). One might note that, before the Sentencing Commission 
had amended its commentary in the way the Supreme Court found contrary to the statute, 
the Ninth Circuit had joined several other circuits in interpreting what was then the 
Commission’s language as requiring application of the enhanced maximum term, the 
position the Supreme Court ultimately adopted. 
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Court is likely to take to reverse or vacate, the data from the intercircuit 
conflict cases are crucial if we are to have a more complete picture of 
how the law of a circuit fares in the Supreme Court. 
In upholding – or rejecting – the Ninth Circuit’s position in cases 
taken from other circuits, the Supreme Court is not likely saying 
anything directly about the Ninth Circuit or its regard for that court. If 
other courts had adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position or had taken a 
stance consistent with it, then a defeat for the Ninth Circuit should not be 
viewed as one for or against, or even aimed at, the Ninth Circuit alone. 
However, in those few instances in which the Ninth Circuit is the only 
court on one side of an intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
might be taken as directed at that court. With those cases perhaps kept 
apart, overall the Ninth Circuit’s record reported here is not so much a 
statement about how the justices view the Ninth Circuit itself as a 
statement about the extent to which the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court read the law in the same way, where influence is more likely to run 
from the Supreme Court to the Ninth Circuit than vice-versa. 
When the Supreme Court rules on the law of a particular circuit in 
the course of deciding a case from another court of appeals, the justices’ 
focus is on the latter, which statistics tell us was likely reviewed in order 
to be overturned. Other circuits’ decisions implicated in the justices’ 
ruling were not their prime concern but in a way are bystanders.105 With 
more than one case on each “side” of most intercircuit conflicts on which 
the justices rule, no one court’s position stands out, except perhaps that 
of the court whose case was reviewed for having created a conflict or 
having made it more visible. This would serve to submerge any one 
court’s association with a doctrinal position the justices considered, at 
least relative to the identification that would occur when the case has 
been taken directly from that court. It would thus limit the possible 
“taint” that might arise from association with the position of another 
                                                                                                             
105 Because judges of the courts of appeals watch each others’ decisions and are 
aware of whether they are creating, or joining, intercircuit conflicts, there is a dynamic 
interaction between the vertical dimension of the Supreme Court - court of appeals 
relationship (the justices accepting cases to review intercircuit conflicts) and the 
horizontal dimension (appeals court judges observing, and responding to, each others’ 
actions). See Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 
MONT. L. REV. 119 (2002). An example of the Supreme Court’s referring to a lower 
court’s acknowledgment of a circuit conflict is United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 
(1987), where Justice Powell pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit, whose case had been 
accepted for review, “acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ‘in a 
case strikingly similar to this one, has reached the opposite conclusion.’ . . . It concluded, 
however, that” the Ninth Circuit case “was wrongly decided.” Id. at 685 (citations 
omitted). 
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court, such as the Ninth Circuit, if, as some have alleged, some justices 
have an animus toward that court. 
It has been suggested that in evaluating certiorari petitions, the 
justices, or their clerks serving in the cert pool, do take into account the 
court from which the case comes and/or the judge who wrote the opinion 
there,106 but there is no evidence to suggest that the clerks or the justices 
look beyond the fact of an intercircuit conflict, as a cue for taking a case, 
to the courts of appeals involved in the conflict when the decision is 
made to grant review. Therefore we cannot be sure whether the Ninth 
Circuit’s presence in a case, either as the source of the case or through its 
presence in an intercircuit conflict, is in the front of the justices’ minds. 
Thus we cannot ascertain whether its presence makes a difference or 
what inference we should draw when the Supreme Court reverses the 
Ninth Circuit at a high rate in cases taken directly from that court, and, of 
particular relevance, we remain unsure of what to make of the justices’ 
treating the Ninth Circuit so well in intercircuit conflict cases taken from 
other circuits. Only if we knew that those at the Supreme Court involved 
in the process of deciding whether to grant review did take into account 
the “other” courts involved in an intercircuit conflict could we begin to 
say that upholding a court of appeals’ position in an intercircuit conflict 
case taken from another court was really a direct comment on the former 
court’s position. 
VII. A LAST NOTE: WHAT COMES NEXT? 
It has been clear at several points in this Article that the research 
begun here could be carried forward and how that might be done. For 
one thing, instead of relying on the cases the Supreme Court cites as 
constituting the intercircuit conflict with which the Court is dealing, 
which the justices often identify only as exemplars (with an “e.g.,”), one 
could look more deeply in certiorari petitions and briefs to find other 
cases which were implicated in the particular circuit split the justices 
attempt to resolve. The study could also be extended by examining 
separately the cases the Supreme Court has taken directly from the Ninth 
Circuit which involved an intercircuit conflict. Here it would be 
important to determine whether the Ninth Circuit was one of two or more 
                                                                                                             
106 See PERRY, supra note 6. Another observer notes the absence of evidence that the 
clerks in the “cert pool” go much beyond the cert. papers in examining cases to develop 
their memos to the justices, so that if the cert. petition or any opposition or amicus brief 
flagged other circuits’ decisions, the pool memo might note them but would not likely do 
so otherwise. Private communication to author. 
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circuits on one side of a circuit split or whether it “stood alone”107 and 
perhaps had created the intercircuit split that led the justices to grant 
certiorari to resolve the conflict. It would also be important to look at 
situations in which multiple circuits were on each side of an intercircuit 
conflict, and to see whether the circuit in which the observer is interested 
– be it the Ninth Circuit or some other court of appeals – had taken the 
“majority position” or was in a minority stance relative to its sister 
circuits.108 
This Article is a study of one circuit, although one to which 
particular attention has been paid because of the rate at which cases taken 
directly from it have been overturned. It is hoped that this Article will 
prompt others to examine what has happened with respect to other 
circuits – to determine how the law of those circuits has fared in 
intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits by comparison with 
cases which go directly from the circuit of interest to the Supreme Court. 
The topic is certainly an important one, and one to which therefore more 
attention should be given in order to extend the work begun in these 
pages. 
                                                                                                             
107 For example, in O.T. 2000, in PGA Tours v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), the 
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, the latter in a decision the day after the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling, were in conflict. However, there were cases in which the Ninth Circuit 
was in conflict with three or four other circuits, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
There was, however, another O.T. 2000 case in which the Ninth Circuit was on one side, 
and nine other circuits were on the other. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105 (2001). 
108 For an instance in which the Ninth Circuit was among circuits adopting the 
“majority” position, which the Supreme Court upheld, see Clay v. United States, 537 
U.S. 522 (2003), in which six circuits were in conflict with two others. The Ninth 
Circuit’s position could also be upheld when it was in the “minority” position, as in 
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002), where there were four circuits against three, 
including the Ninth Circuit. 
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